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PROSECUTING THOSE BEARING
“GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY”: THE
LESSONS OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE
CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH

*

This Article examines the controversial article 1(1) of the Statute of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) giving that tribunal the
competence “to prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility” for
serious international and domestic crimes committed during the latter part
of the notoriously brutal Sierra Leonean conflict. The debate that arose
during the SCSL trials was whether this bare statement constituted a
jurisdictional requirement that the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt or merely a type of guideline for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. The judges of the court split on the issue. This
paper is the first to critically assess the reasons why the tribunal’s judges
disagreed in the interpretation of this seemingly simple legal question. It
then attempts to discern the common ground in the judicial reasoning,
and argues that the ultimate conclusion that “greatest responsibility”
implied that leaders as well as the worst killers may be prosecuted is a
welcome jurisprudential contribution to our understanding of personal
jurisdiction in international criminal law. The paper makes several
contributions to the literature. First, it takes up and highlights a widely
ignored but important legal question. Second, it demonstrates why the
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reasoning of the Appeals Chamber was results-oriented and wrong.
Finally, it identifies the lessons of Sierra Leone and builds on them to
offer preliminary recommendations on how the greatest responsibility
conundrum can be avoided when drafting personal jurisdiction clauses
for future ad hoc international penal tribunals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL” or “the court”) was
established through a bilateral treaty between the United Nations and
1
the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) signed on January 16, 2002.
2
The SCSL’s jurisdiction ratione materiae included crimes against
humanity, war crimes, other serious violations of international
humanitarian law, as well as various offenses under Sierra Leonean law
prohibiting the abuse of underage girls, wanton destruction of property,
3
4
and arson. Though the Sierra Leonean conflict started in March 1991,
5
the jurisdiction ratione temporis only covers the crimes perpetrated
6
after November 30, 1996. This means that, over the objections of the
national authorities, the international community, as represented by the
U.N., only supported prosecution of the atrocities committed during the
7
8
second half of the conflict. With respect to ratione loci jurisdiction, the
Court was authorized to prosecute the crimes that occurred within the
9
territory of Sierra Leone.
Given the SCSL’s limited subject matter, temporal, and territorial
10
jurisdiction, it is evident that the U.N.’s goal was to establish an ad hoc
tribunal with a narrower and more focused mandate compared to the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(ICTY and ICTR), which had been created by the Security Council
11
(“UNSC” or “the Council”) in 1993 and 1994, respectively.

1. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.-Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement].
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009) (directing reader from jurisdiction
ratione materiae to subject-matter jurisdiction).
3. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 2–5, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
145 [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
4. U.N. Secretary-General, Report on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Secretary-General, Report on
SCSL].
5. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009) (directing reader from jurisdiction
ratione temporis to temporal jurisdiction).
6. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1); Secretary-General, Report on
SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 25.
7. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
8. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (9th ed. 2009) (“By reason of place.”).
9. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
10. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 1, 12, 27.
11. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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Article 1(1) of the U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, and its annexed
statute, defined the Court’s ratione personae jurisdiction—that is, the
12
“power to bring a person into its adjudicative process.” It gave the
SCSL competence in the following terms: “to prosecute persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law . . . including those leaders
who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of
13
and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”
A. Greatest Responsibility Jurisdiction and Its Significance
There is no aspect of the Court’s jurisdiction that was more
controversial than the notion that it should prosecute only those persons
bearing “the greatest responsibility” for what happened in Sierra Leone
during the second half of that country’s notoriously brutal conflict.
Indeed, the idea of greatest responsibility had been controversial from
the moment the UNSC proposed the phrase to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral (UNSG) as a way to define the SCSL’s personal jurisdiction in
the resolution that it requested him to negotiate with the GoSL to
14
establish the court. Several factors explain why this qualified personal
jurisdiction was contentious, which in turn, make the issue worthy of
further study in this article.
First, while both the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and the SCSL
15
Statute included the phrase, neither specified what it meant. Yet, both
instruments gave prominence to the idea as each mentioned the phrase
16
at least twice: first, in the personal jurisdiction provision in Article 1(1),
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (9th ed. 2009).
13. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1 (emphasis added). The Agreement between the
United Nations and Sierra Leone also provided, in Article 1, as follows:
(1) There is hereby established a Special Court for Sierra Leone to prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since 30 November 1996.
(2) The Special Court shall function in accordance with the Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Statute is annexed to this Agreement and
forms an integral part thereof.
U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1.
14. See S.C. Res. 1315, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). For an account of
the controversy, see Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 29–31.
15. Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 395, 413 (2011).
16. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1,
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and second, in the clause setting out the powers of the prosecutor in
17
Article 15 of the Statute. Although the framers appeared to have
included these two provisions to underscore the court’s narrow
jurisdiction and to ensure that the prosecutions would stay within the
strict boundaries that they had demarcated, Article 1 and Article 15,
when taken separately but also when considered together, sent two
apparently contradictory messages.
When taken separately, the provisions in Article 1 suggested, at least
to the defense counsel and their clients, that the greatest responsibility
phrase established a jurisdictional requirement that the prosecution
18
must fulfill. A (perceived) failure to do so meant that the defense
could challenge the non-compliance before the judges. If successful, the
defendants would not be prosecutable by the tribunal. When taken
together, Article 15 and Article 1 gave rise to a debate about the actual
mandate and function of the prosecutor, in particular, the extent and
limits of his discretion in deciding whom to prosecute. Effectively, the
defendants sought to take advantage of the vagueness of the greatest
responsibility formulation in both provisions, attempting to further curb
the scope of the prosecutorial power by suggesting that the prosecutor
had acted beyond his competence in seeking to prosecute them instead
19
of others. The problem is that the prosecution’s fight to keep its turf
tended to exaggerate the broad scope of its authority and further
masked the real nature of greatest responsibility jurisdiction.
Second, although the UNSC, the U.N. Secretary-General, and the
GoSL purportedly agreed on the meaning of “greatest responsibility” in
the letters that they exchanged during the negotiations of the court’s
20
founding instruments, the correspondence was marked by sharp
disagreement and ultimately left a measure of ambiguity regarding the
21
actual purpose and implications of the phrase. So, once the tribunal
art. 1.
17. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(1).
18. Jalloh, supra note 15, at 414–15.
19. See discussion infra Part III.B–C.
20. U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from the President of the
Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/2001/95 (Jan. 31,
2001) [hereinafter Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C.].
21. Yet, undoubtedly because of awareness of the controversies that dogged this phrase
in Sierra Leone, the draft statute for the Special Tribunal for Kenya, which ultimately failed
to obtain sufficient support in that country’s Parliament, at least attempted to provide a
definition. See Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, pt. I, § 2 (Jan. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Bills/2009/The_Special_Tribunal_for_Kenya_Statute_20
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was established and became operational, it would only take a matter of
time for the issue to boil to the surface and for the judges to be asked to
give their rulings on the subject.
Third, starting with the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg (“IMT” or “Nuremberg Tribunal”) continuing through the
ad hoc ICTY and ICTR and the permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC), the thrust of international criminal law has been to focus
22
on prosecuting the top leaders and architects of mass atrocities.
However, this was the first time that the language mandating the
prosecution of only those bearing greatest responsibility was introduced
23
into the statute of an ad hoc, international, penal tribunal. Though on
one level this could be argued to be an innovation in the SCSL, the
reality is that, as this article will show, the vague greatest responsibility
phrase was more of an explicit limitation on the court’s jurisdiction in
24
terms of the number of people that it would eventually prosecute.
While the SCSL’s work is nearing completion, with appeals
judgment outstanding solely in the case involving former Liberian
25
President Charles Taylor as of this writing, the debate about the nature
and scope of greatest responsibility is important for a proper assessment
of the jurisprudential legacy of the court. More significantly, it seems
crucial because it might offer useful lessons for future formulations of
personal jurisdiction in other international criminal courts. Indeed,
while both the ICTY and ICTR were endowed with personal
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute “persons responsible,” since the
establishment of the SCSL, it appears that the “greatest responsibility”
threshold has become the gold standard for the framing of ratione
personae jurisdiction in contemporary international criminal courts.
09.pdf.
22. See discussion infra Part II.A–B.
23. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
24. See infra Part II.B. In fact, the President of the Special Court later presented the
uniquely structured personal jurisdiction as an “innovation in the structure of international
courts and tribunals.” GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE (2002–2003), available at http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= NRhDcbHrcSs%3d&tabid=176.
25. Oral hearing of the appeal commenced at 10:00 a.m. on Jan. 22, 2013. Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-A, Decision on Urgent Motion for Reconsideration or Review
of
“Scheduling
Order,”
(Dec.
5,
2012),
available
at
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=%2fE4wpxbRJr8%3d&tabid=191;
Jennifer
Easterday,
Parties In Taylor Trial Make Appeals Submissions, THE TRIAL OF CHARLES TAYLOR (Jan.
22, 2013), http://www.charlestaylortrial.org/2013/01/22/parties-in-taylor-trial-make-appealssubmissions/.
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Surprisingly, although a decade-long controversy persisted over the
meaning of greatest responsibility at the court, the question of what
exactly the phrase means and the benchmark, if any, that the
prosecutors of international criminal courts with an expiry date should
use to select those persons most deserving of prosecution inside their
own courtrooms, as opposed to domestic ones, seems to have escaped
26
Perhaps the general feeling outside the
the attention of scholars.
defense bar at the SCSL was that resolving this question would not
change the outcome in the concrete cases brought by the prosecution, or
that, as Professor David Cohen has argued, this type of narrow personal
jurisdiction essentially relieved the court of the burden of deciding
27
whether to prosecute any middle or lower ranking perpetrators. Or it
may be that, as Professor William Schabas has suggested, academic
lawyers recognized greatest responsibility as a rather vacuous concept
that said more about donor generosity in the first court, which would be
funded entirely by donations from states, than something with “any
28
autonomous legal meaning.”
Yet, the moral and practical dangers of glossing over “greatest
responsibility” jurisdiction will remain for time and resource constrained
international criminal tribunals. The SCSL’s attempt to grasp this
proverbial nettle appears to, therefore, have wider significance for other
penal courts tasked with a similar mandate. This is all the more so
because states increasingly resort to the greatest responsibility formula
popularized by the court to indicate the attitude that the expensive work
of international criminal tribunals should generally be limited to trials of
only a handful of top leaders instead of a large number of perpetrators,
29
including lower ranked suspects.
It is against this backdrop that this Article, which seeks to fill the
current gap in the literature, will attempt to discern the meaning of
“greatest responsibility” personal jurisdiction. Its general aims are
26. Although a Westlaw TP-ALL database search of the phrase “those who bear the
greatest responsibility” returned approximately 120 results, only one article seems to have
taken up the issue. See Sean Morrison, Extraordinary Language in the Courts of Cambodia:
Interpreting the Limiting Language and Personal Jurisdiction of the Cambodian Tribunal, 37
CAP. U. L. REV. 583, 610–14 (2009).
27. David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia:
“Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2007) (discussing
the creation of the SCSL).
28. W.A. Schabas, Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 879, 882
n.11 (2005).
29. See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
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twofold.
First, to determine how that phrase was developed,
interpreted, and applied for the first time in international criminal law at
the SCSL. Essentially, even as the court introduced this phrase to our
lexicon, I will examine whether the judges advanced our understanding
of this type of narrow way of setting out personal jurisdiction, and, if so,
how and if not, why not. Second, to situate the SCSL’s experience
within the broader normative evolution of international criminal justice.
The idea is to identify, to the extent possible, the types of lessons that
should be learned for future tribunals that might be expressly created
with a limited mandate of bringing only the architects of the core crimes
to justice. Besides the moral dilemma inherent in conferring impunity
on some through their non-prosecution, while prosecuting a few others,
it is important to determine whether the SCSL devised a principled
approach to greatest responsibility that might serve at least as a starting
point for considerations of who should be the targets for internationally
supported prosecutions from among a mass of perpetrators.
Overall, while noting that the U.N., in particular the Security
Council, made some problematic jurisdictional choices that ultimately
resulted in the SCSL conducting an inadequate number of prosecutions
compared to the ICTY and the ICTR, I will argue that the court’s
jurisprudence on this question has offered international criminal law a
useful starting point regarding how to determine who it is that may be
said to bear greatest responsibility for the purposes of prosecution in an
international criminal court.
That said, I will show that the
interpretation preferred by the majority of the SCSL judges focused
more on ensuring that those before the court would actually be tried
rather than engaging the more challenging issue about how we might
best distinguish between those that have greater versus lesser degrees of
individual criminal responsibility for the international crimes committed
in a given armed conflict.
B. Structure of the Article and Main Arguments
The article is organized as follows. Part II provides a brief overview
of the way that personal jurisdiction has been expressed in international
criminal courts from the watershed Nuremberg International Military
Tribunal to the present. By reviewing the personal jurisdiction clauses
of prior ad hoc courts, this section of the paper will demonstrate that the
focus of such tribunals has generally been to punish only a limited group
of persons in high-ranking leadership positions. The tendency to
emphasize the so-called big fish, instead of small fish, continued as a
general matter with the modern ICTY and ICTR, and due to a variety
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of factors, including concerns about costs and speed, reached its apex by
the time the SCSL was formally established.
In Part III, I examine the fierce disagreement regarding the meaning
of “greatest responsibility,” which, driven by the challenges made by
some defense counsel, arose between the judges of the two trial
chambers at the SCSL. I will show that Trial Chamber I correctly
determined that greatest responsibility was intended to be both a
jurisdictional requirement and a guideline for the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, while Trial Chamber II incorrectly interpreted
it solely as a type of guidance for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Although the Appeals Chamber weighed in to endorse what I
respectfully submit was the wrong interpretation, thereby weakening the
value of the court’s case law on this issue, there was sufficient common
ground among the majority of the SCSL judges. We can therefore
discern a clear jurisprudential path holding that greatest responsibility
personal jurisdiction should be understood to include both those in
leadership and high ranking positions as well as their most cruel
underlings, whose conduct was so outrageous and beyond the pale that
it merited international, rather than domestic, investigation and
prosecution.
In Part IV, I use established methods of treaty interpretation in an
attempt to locate the ordinary meaning of the phrase “to prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility” in light of the text, object
and purpose of the SCSL Statute and the drafting history of that
provision, as well as the tribunal’s judicial practice. In this regard, I
assess the extent to which the solution proffered by the appeals court
judges was consistent, or inconsistent, with the apparent intention
behind the greatest responsibility clause articulated in Article 1. I will
contend that had the Appeals Chamber adopted a different reading of
the law, it would still have been able to dispense justice—contrary to
what it implied in its judgment—and in that way, would have made a
better contribution to the court’s ultimate jurisprudential legacy.
Part V draws some conclusions. I offer preliminary reflections on
ways treaty drafters might in the future alleviate some of the challenges
inherent in deploying the greatest responsibility personal jurisdiction
standard as the statutory mandate for the investigation and prosecution
of some of the world’s worst crimes.
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II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
FROM NUREMBERG TO FREETOWN
A. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals Had Limited Personal
Jurisdiction
Although unique in its terminology, the SCSL is not alone in having
30
a restricted personal jurisdiction. In fact, there is a discernible trend to
limit international tribunal prosecutions to a relatively small group of
political and military leaders deemed most responsible for the
31
widespread violence. This doctrinal attitude dates back to the origins
32
of modern international criminal law. It is predicated on the pragmatic
recognition that individual accountability at the international level,
when compared to domestic legal systems, can only be meted out swiftly
and efficiently in relation to a small group of perpetrators. Thus, by
circumscribing the scope of international trials in the hope of deterring
the top brass, rather than all of them together with their subordinates,
international penal law also carves out an informal division of labor
between national and international criminal jurisdictions. One way it
increasingly does this is to devise institutional mechanisms to ensure
that the planners, leaders and others responsible for fomenting heinous
international crimes are prosecuted at the international level wherever
33
the relevant national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to prosecute.
This arrangement anticipates that the middle and lower ranking suspects
would be investigated and prosecuted in domestic courts so that there is
34
This general approach finds expression in the
no impunity gap.
personal jurisdiction clauses of international criminal courts and in their

30. See generally Morrison, supra note 26, at 605–15 (discussing the limiting language in
personal jurisdiction statutes of ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, as well as the manner in which
that language has been interpreted).
31. See Morrison, supra note 26, at 588. See generally Cohen, supra note 27.
32. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter]; see also Memorandum to President Roosevelt
from the Secretaries of State and War and Attorney General, § III (Jan. 22, 1945), available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack01.asp (noting that the “outstanding offenders are, of
course, those leaders of the Nazi Party and German Reich who since January 30, 1933, have
been in control of formulating and executing Nazi policies”).
33. See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009–2012, para. 19 (Feb. 1, 2010)
[hereinafter Prosecutorial Strategy]; Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial
Strategy, pt. II, ICC (Sept. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Report on Prosecutorial Strategy].
34. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 33, para. 19; Report on Prosecutorial
Strategy, supra note 33, pt. II.a.
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35

practice.
Article 1 of the IMT Charter declared as its purpose “the just and
prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the
36
European Axis.”
Under the heading “Jurisdiction and General
Principles,” Article 6 specified that the tribunal “shall have the power to
try and punish persons who . . . whether as individuals or as members of
organizations, committed . . . crimes against peace[,] . . . war crimes[,] . . .
37
[and] crimes against humanity.” In a provision that seems to be more
about the modes of participation in international crimes than about
personal jurisdiction as such, Article 6 spelled out the types of
individuals that were envisaged to fall within the personal jurisdiction as
those “[l]eaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in
the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit
any of the foregoing crimes” and, moreover, placed responsibility on
these individuals “for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
38
such plan.” The Tokyo Tribunal essentially reflected an identical
39
position in Articles 1 and 5 of its statute, although its geographic focus
40
was on the “major war criminals in the Far East,” whereas the IMT
addressed those who masterminded the atrocities committed in the
41
European theatre.
42
Despite some criticisms of those tribunals as “victor’s justice,” as
part of their achievements, they did prosecute and convict high-ranking
government officials associated with the German and Japanese wartime
regimes. In the Nuremberg Tribunal, these ranged from Herman

35. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); Agreement Between the United Nations
and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law
of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, U.N.-Cambodia, art. 1,
June 6, 2003, 2329 U.N.T.S. 117 [hereinafter U.N.-Cambodian Agreement]; U.N.-Sierra
Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1); Morrison, supra note 26, at 587–88.
36. IMT Charter, supra note 31, art. 1 (emphasis added).
37. Id. art. 6.
38. Id.
39. Id. art. 1–6; cf. International Military Tribunal for the Far East arts. 1–5, Jan. 19,
1946, 4 U.S.T. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter], available at
http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/04/4-06/military-tribunal-far-east.xml.
40. IMTFE Charter, supra note 39, art. 1.
41. IMT Charter, supra note 32, art. 1.
42. William A. Schabas, Victor’s Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International
Criminal Court, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 535, 537 (2010) (quoting Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims
and Witnesses, ¶ 21 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995).
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43

Goering, the “Successor Designate” to Adolf Hitler, to the commander
in chief of the Germany Navy, Admiral Karl Doenitz, who later
replaced the Fuehrer after he committed suicide, and to a number of
44
other highly ranked military and civilian officials. Those prosecutions
set the stage for the subsequent American and other allied national
prosecutions of World War II offenses within their respective zones of
45
occupation under Control Council Law 10. Even in the setting of allied
country prosecutions, it was, at least initially, mainly senior military
46
officers that were tried.
These officers spanned from lieutenant
colonels to majors, captains, and generals, as exemplified by, for
47
instance, the United States v. Pohl case.
Similarly, at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE), twenty-eight of the eighty initially detained “Class A war
48
criminals” were prosecuted, eighteen of whom were military officers.
United States Army General Douglas McArthur effectively shielded
49
Japanese Emperor Hirohito from prosecution. However, the list of the
others put on trial included four former Japanese premiers, six generals,
several former ministers of war and foreign affairs, ranking
50
ambassadors, and other important advisers on matters of state.
This brief summary appears sufficient to confirm that, although not
employing the “greatest responsibility” language to delimit their
personal jurisdiction, from the genesis of international criminal justice,
43. International Military Tribunal, Indictment, app. A, in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 27 (Oct. 6, 1945)
[hereinafter IMT, Indictment, app. A], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/counta.asp.
44. Id.
45. NUREMBERG TRIALS FINAL REPORT app. D (Dec. 20, 1945) (Control Council, Law
No. 10, art. III), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp.
46. See id. art. 2; IMT, Indictment, app. A, supra note 43.
47. United States v. Pohl, Indictment of the International Military Tribunal, Trials of the
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
vol. 5 (Jan. 13, 1947), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/indict4.asp.
48. United States v. Araki, Indictment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, app. E (1946), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE TOKYO INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL: CHARTER, INDICTMENT, AND JUDGMENTS 63–69 (Neil Boister & Robert Cryer
eds., 2008) [hereinafter Araki Indictment]; see also TIMOTHY P. MAGA, JUDGMENT AT
TOKYO: THE JAPANESE WAR CRIMES TRIALS 2 (2001) (noting that the eighty indicted men
classified as “Class A war criminal suspects” including, “war ministers, former generals,
economic and financial leaders, an imperial advisor, an admiral, and a colonel . . . were
accused of plotting and carrying out a war of conquest; murdering, maiming, and ill-treating
civilians and prisoners of war; plunder; rape; and ‘other barbaric cruelties”).
49. HERBERT P. BIX, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN 587 (2000).
50. Araki Indictment, supra note 48, app. E.
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the focus of cases in the ad hoc international courts has not been to
prosecute everyone that might have committed a crime. Rather, the
objective has been to prosecute a smaller number of leaders, architects,
and planners of the mass atrocities. As with national criminal law, the
assumption, although not yet empirically proven, seems to be that this
philosophy will deter specific individuals as well as others, in a more
general sense, who might otherwise emulate them in their repugnant
conduct. Indeed, the persons tried, both at Nuremberg and at Tokyo,
were those that largely held important political and military posts in the
government hierarchy. For the most part, these were not direct
perpetrators of crimes, but people who used, or rather abused, their
positions of authority to order, instigate, or encourage subordinates to
51
The convicted perpetrators were
commit reprehensible crimes.
deemed more culpable than their junior partners and enforcers who
52
actually implemented their orders. In any event, in the other instances
where the direct perpetrators of the crimes were prosecuted through
national level prosecutions, the gravity, brutality, and scale of their
crimes generally served as ample justification for their investigation,
prosecution, and punishment.
B. Contemporary International Tribunals Also Have Limited Personal
Jurisdiction
The ICTY and ICTR adopted similar ways of defining their personal
jurisdictions as the IMT and IMTFE immediately after World War II.
The context of their establishment suggested that they were also created
to bring the top perpetrators of international crimes to justice. Perhaps
reflecting what may have been the golden age of international criminal
justice, and its perceived high potential to assist in solving the
intractable problems of impunity in post-conflict situations, in their
respective jurisdictional provisions, the statutes of the U.N. twin
tribunals both provided in their Article 1 that they “shall have the
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
53
international humanitarian law.” This was notably distinct from the
51. See supra notes 43, 47 and accompanying text.
52. See generally IMT, Indictment, supra note 43, app. A (referring to misuse of highranking positions, personal influence, and intimate connections in the statement of
responsibility for individuals indicted).
53. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, Annex I, art. 1 (emphasis added); U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704, Annex I, art. 1 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY
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formulation used in the later Sierra Leone court conferring on the
tribunal “the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility” for the serious international humanitarian and Sierra
Leonean law violations that took place in the context of that country’s
54
conflict.
It is true that in the resolutions preceding the creation of the ICTY
and ICTR, the UNSC repeatedly emphasized its determination to bring
to justice all those persons responsible for the commission of
55
But those decisions should be understood in
international crimes.
context. They were taken at a time when the international community
was faced with bitter and ongoing conflicts characterized by atrocity
crimes and a climate of ongoing hostilities in which stopping the further
commission of heinous offenses was an obvious international policy
56
goal. They were thus worded in a way that exaggeratingly suggested
that more than a limited group of perpetrators would be prosecuted and
punished by each of those institutions. This emphasis makes sense given
the clear deterrent goal of international criminal law. The reality
proved to be different, however, although far more than the IMT and
IMTFE, the U.N. tribunals have also succeeded in prosecuting a large
part of the middle management of the atrocities in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively. Sometimes, for various pragmatic
reasons, such as the need to show concrete results in the early days,
those ad hocs even ended up with prosecutions of otherwise insignificant
perpetrators, such as Dusko Tadic and Jean-Paul Akayesu, who were
not necessarily the most culpable persons in the grand scheme of
things—at least when it comes to their official ranks. In other words,
even though those individuals were important, they were ultimately
minor players who were not the brains behind the massive offenses
committed in the Balkans and Africa during the early 1990s.
The problem is that the initial enthusiasm for international criminal
Statute] (emphasis added). Articles 6 and 5 of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, respectively,
clarify that the jurisdiction of the tribunal only applies to natural persons. ICTY statute,
supra, art. 6; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, Annex I, art. 5. Under Articles 15(1) and 16(1), the
prosecutor’s role is to prosecute “persons responsible” for the serious violations of IHL
committed in the former Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, Annex I, art. 15(1); ICTY
statute, supra, art. 16(1). U.N.S.C. Res. 808 and Res. 955 decided on February 22, 1993, and
November 8, 1994, respectively, to establish the tribunal to prosecute “persons responsible.”
S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808, ¶ 1 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, art. 1.
54. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1.
55. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11, ¶ 1.
56. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11.
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justice, which coincided with the end of the Cold War and a new era of
East–West cooperation in the Council, did not last. In the intervening
years between the creation of the ICTY and ICTR tribunals in 1993 and
57
58
1994, and the Sierra Leone court in 2002, there had been much
discussion among the powerful countries (especially the United States)
59
about the viability of the ad hoc Chapter VII tribunal model. The so60
called “[t]ribunal fatigue,” driven primarily by concerns about the slow
pace of the international trials and the spiraling costs of those U.N.
61
courts, is said to have taken hold of the UNSC and the United States
62
government in particular. It therefore seems like a deliberate decision,
in a move to what was perceived to be a more financially viable and a
more politically acceptable model, to limit the jurisdiction of future
courts, like the SCSL, to prosecuting only a handful of persons in
leadership positions deemed to bear greatest responsibility for the
serious international humanitarian law violations committed during the
West African nation’s war.
Interestingly, although the phrasing of the personal jurisdiction
clause that granted the SCSL authority was a departure from the
equivalent personal jurisdiction language in the statutes for the U.N.
63
Chapter VII tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR, in their respective Rules
64
65
jurisprudence,
and Completion
of Procedure and Evidence,
66
Strategies, now use similar language expressing the greatest
57. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 11.
58. U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1), (23).
59. David J. Scheffer, Remarks, Challenges Confronting International Justice Issues, 4
NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 1, 4–6 (1998).
60. Scheffer, supra note 59, at 1.
61. Morrison, supra note 26, at 587–88; Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, State Department Views on the Future of War
Crimes Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 482, 483 (2002).
62. Scheffer, supra note 59, at 2.
63. Compare SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1) (“greatest responsibility”), with S.C.
Res. 955, supra note 11, art. 1, and S.C. Res. 827, supra note 11, art. 2 (“persons responsible”).
64. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
Rule 11 bis, 28, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 45 (Dec. 8, 2010); International Tribunal for Rwanda,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (June 29, 1995).
65. Prosecutor v. Luckic, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on the Referral of Case
Pursuant to Rule 11 bis with Confidential Annex A and Annex B, ¶¶ 28, 30 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 5, 2007); Prosecutor v. Todovi , Case No. IT-97-25/1AR11bis.1, Decision on Savo Todovi ’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral under Rule 11
bis, ¶¶ 19–22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 4, 2006).
66. S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); Completion Strategy for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, transmitted by letter dated Oct. 3, 2003 from the
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67

responsibility limitation.
As the tribunals came under increased
political pressure from the council to wrap up their work, they have had
to identify the top layer deemed most responsible and appropriate for
68
trial within their jurisdiction. They now leave it to the willing national
jurisdictions to pursue the remainder of the fugitives, either through
independently initiated prosecutions of lower ranked suspects or
voluntary acceptance of transferred cases of the alleged middle level
69
perpetrators to national courts.
Similarly, in the other ad hoc criminal court negotiated by the U.N.
with one of its member states around the same time period as the SCSL,
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC or
Cambodia Tribunal), the international community adopted a similarly
70
worded jurisdictional provision. This lends further credence to the
idea of tribunal fatigue taking hold at the level of U.N. member states,
although a different set of factors including a government that was not
always necessarily acting in good faith, were at play in the Cambodia
context, as compared to the Sierra Leone negotiations with the U.N.,
which demonstrated strong national–political will to deal with the
question of accountability for the international crimes experienced
during the conflict.
Be that as it may, Article 1 of the ECCC Law empowered it to
prosecute the “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who
71
were most responsible for the crimes.” Much like the Sierra Leone
Court, which was also territorially and temporally confined in its ability
to prosecute compared to the ICTY and ICTR, the Cambodia Tribunal
was intended to carry out a limited number of prosecutions of senior
leaders along with those apparently deemed to possess the greatest level
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/946,
para. 6 (Oct. 6, 2003).
67. See supra notes 63–66.
68. Murphy, supra note 61, at 483 (on U.S. encouragement of ad hoc tribunal
completion strategies); Pierre-Richard Prosper & Michael A. Newton, The Bush
Administration View of International Accountability, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 891, 897 (2002)
(on U.S. support for the greatest responsibility limitation).
69. Prosper & Newton, supra note 68, at 896–97.
70. Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, as
amended, Reach Kram., No. NS/RKM/1004/006, Oct. 27, 2004 (Cambodia) [hereinafter
ECCC Law], available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_La
w_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng.pdf and http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/legal-doc
uments/Kram_and_KR_Law_amendments_27_Oct_2004_--_Eng.pdf (unofficial translation).
71. ECCC Law, supra note 70, art. 1; U.N.-Cambodian Agreement, supra note 35, art. 1.
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72

of responsibility.
In the same vein, although having a distinctive multilateral treaty
basis, vis-à-vis the ad hoc tribunals, Article 1 of the Rome Statute of the
permanent Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC) defines the
competence of the global penal court as the power to “exercise its
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
73
concern.” There is plainly no explicit limitation on the ICC’s personal
jurisdiction, although it appears that most states were clearly more
interested in having a broad personal jurisdiction for the permanent
74
international tribunal than a narrower one.
On the other hand, this might have been less of an issue since
various restrictions were imposed on the permanent court’s jurisdiction
through several carefully negotiated substantive provisions that gave the
first bite at the prosecutorial apple to states. However, rather
interestingly, the ICC Prosecutor has in her policy papers, strategy
documents and emerging practice interpreted this reference to personal
jurisdiction as mandating a focus only on those “who bear the greatest
75
responsibility.” The foregoing brief review suggests that, as states have
developed more experience designing and managing international
criminal tribunals, they increasingly seem to prefer to confer a relatively
narrow type of personal jurisdiction—at least when it comes to the more

72. ECCC Law, supra note 70; U.N.-Cambodian Agreement, supra note 35, art. 1.
Although, even though it is expected to only prosecute a handful of people, Article (1) of the
Statute of the Lebanon Tribunal has, perhaps as a reflection of a lesson learned by the
Secretary-General about the controversies of greatest responsibility, returned to use of the
phrase “to prosecute persons responsible.” S.C. Res. 1757, Annex, art. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1757 (May 30, 2007).
73. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 (emphasis added).
74. See id. art. 1 & pmbl.
75. See ICC-OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor 7
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b2560aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf (stating that the Office of the Prosecutor will
“focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest
responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly responsible for those
crimes” (emphasis omitted)); see also Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note 35, para. 19 (“In
accordance with this statutory scheme, the Office consolidated a policy of focused
investigations and prosecutions, meaning it will investigate and prosecute those who bear the
greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes, based on the evidence that emerges in the
course of an investigation.” (emphasis omitted)); Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, supra note
35, para. 2(b); Luis Moreno-Ocampo, The International Criminal Court: Seeking Global
Justice, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 215, 221 (2008) (stating that “[m]y role is to prosecute
those bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious crimes”).
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prominent, situation-specific ad hoc international criminal courts like
the SCSL. Much of this was concern about controlling spiraling costs
and keeping the international justice project on the cheap.
This broader international context helps to explain why the U.N.,
and in particular the Security Council, introduced the problematic
“greatest responsibility” personal jurisdiction into international criminal
law’s lexicon through the SCSL Statute. It therefore suggests reasons to
be cautious in celebrating the addition of this phrase into our vocabulary
because of what it implies. The phrase effectively signals the reduced
political will amongst states to ensure the broadest possible
investigations and prosecutions of perpetrators of serious international
offenses that reach beneath the top layer to uncover others, perhaps of a
lesser rank, who should also be held accountable for mass crimes. On
the other hand, it may be countered that settling on a particular and
more realistic phraseology for personal jurisdiction is part of the
maturing of international criminal tribunals. It can also be seen as a way
to manage the currently high expectations about what these courts can
realistically contribute in societies torn apart by brutal conflict.
Be that as it may, at the end of the day, more than any other factor,
the UNSC’s decision to limit the jurisdiction of the SCSL to those with
greatest responsibility was driven by pragmatic, political, economic, and
other realpolitik considerations. This in turn affected the mandate that
the court was given—essentially, to investigate and prosecute a handful
of persons in leadership positions based on a strict personal, temporal,
76
and territorial jurisdiction, which would help to ensure, it was hoped at
the time, that all the court’s trials would be completed within three
77
years.
III. THE JUDICIAL DEBATE REGARDING THE MEANING OF GREATEST
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
A. Approaches to Interpretation of Greatest Responsibility
Once indictments were issued and suspects were arrested, some of
76. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
77. As I have argued elsewhere, the number of persons that it was expected would be
prosecuted by the SCSL reportedly totaled between two to three dozen. See Jalloh, supra
note 15, at 420–22. Unfortunately, the tribunal, partly because of this constrained greatest
responsibility mandate and a conservative prosecutorial interpretation of that language, only
successfully completed about nine cases. Id. For a court that operated for over ten years, this
meant that the tribunal averaged less than one case per year. Id. (criticizing the “extremely
small number of trials” ultimately carried out).
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the defense counsel at the SCSL immediately filed motions asking the
judges to clarify the exact scope of Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute,
78
which is entitled “Competence of the Special Court.” As the provision
is key to the analysis in this article, and was reproduced in essentially the
same form in Article 1(1) of the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement, to which
the statute was an annex, it is worth setting out in full, as follows:
The Special Court shall, except as provided in subparagraph (2),
have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian
law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in
committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of
79
and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.
In construing this clause, honing in for now on the vague italicized
80
portion, at least three possible interpretations can be discerned.
The first is that Article 1(1) required the prosecution of the persons
deemed most responsible or most culpable for the serious crimes
perpetrated in Sierra Leone. On this view, a key criterion for selection
could be the rank or position held by the persons in this category and
whether they were the movers and shakers behind the conflict and the
widespread commission of the crimes. This interpretation, which as we
81
shall see later was apparently the one preferred by the prosecution,
would emphasize the leadership status of the suspect and whether the
suspect had the capacity to impact the general course of events over the
years of the war, but failed to prevent or punish the wrongful conduct of
the perpetrators. The thrust would effectively be on the top political
and or military leaders who committed, planned, instigated, ordered, or
otherwise aided and abetted the heinous international crimes that were
perpetrated by the combatants under their command, control and
supervision. For convenience, in this Article, we may call this the
political-military leader category.
78. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, ¶¶ 1–2 (Mar. 3, 2004).
79. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1) (emphasis added); See U.N.-Sierra Leone
Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1.
80. Further on in this Article, I will examine the second part of that phrase reading as
follows: including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.
81. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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A second interpretation implied by the greatest responsibility
language in the above provision was that the court prosecutor could
scour the lower rank and file who perpetrated the various crimes within
the SCSL’s jurisdiction and select from among them those who did not
necessarily hold high ranking positions in the military or political
structures of the various parties to the conflict. Instead, he would
choose those who were most cruel and most notorious for the brutality
and depravity of their crimes. In other words, the jurisdiction could be
read as a directive to pursue the worst persons, killers, or ordinary
combatants whose criminal acts caused the most harm, to the most
victims, in the most brutal way during the period falling within the
SCSL’s temporal jurisdiction. We could refer to this group of
prospective suspects bearing greatest responsibility as the killerperpetrator category.
Irrespective of which of the above two categories a particular
defendant falls into, it is likely that he would argue that he fell outside
the jurisdiction of the court because he was merely a foot soldier, rather
than a political or military leader, and vice versa. But many lawyers
might perhaps agree more with the third plausible interpretation of the
first part of Article 1(1). In this view, asserting that the tribunal has
power to prosecute those bearing greatest responsibility would indicate
that individuals from either, or better yet, both the political-military
leadership and the killer-perpetrator categories are prosecutable. The
82
latter interpretation of the clause, its drafting history, as well as the
SCSL’s practice seems to confirm that the last is ultimately the better
and more flexible way to construe the greatest responsibility personal
jurisdiction—at least from a prosecutorial and, perhaps, even an
interest-of-justice perspective.
The simplicity with which these three plausible interpretations of
Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute are suggested here belies the fierce
judicial discord on how best to interpret this phrase amongst the judges
of Trial Chambers I and II. It also masks the fact that the prosecution
faced a steady stream of challenges from the defense, throughout some
of the trials, claiming that the accused should not be prosecuted because
they were not among those envisaged to fall within the jurisdiction of
the tribunal. Indeed, so much time and energy was wasted by lawyers
and judges debating the meaning of greatest responsibility that it might
even have had a chilling effect on the prosecutor’s decision not to
82. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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pursue additional suspects for the crimes apparently committed in Sierra
Leone.
Nonetheless, despite curiously reaching divergent legal conclusions
as to whether Article 1(1) was a jurisdictional requirement (Trial
83
Chamber I) or a mere guideline for prosecutorial strategy (Trial
84
Chamber II), the SCSL judges were in general agreement that the
phrase mandating the prosecution of those bearing greatest
responsibility contained in the tribunal statute implicitly included what I
have here characterized as the political-military leadership and killer85
perpetrator categories.
Put differently, even though the phrase
“greatest responsibility” was highly divisive when debated during the
86
Freetown trials, a lesson from the SCSL case law is that the greatest
responsibility phrase should, as a prima facie matter, be interpreted as a
broad jurisdictional grant capable of covering both different types of
87
actors and different types of conduct in a given armed conflict.
That said, as I will endeavor to show shortly, a review of the relevant
case law demonstrates that there was conflation of several important
questions that muddied the greatest responsibility waters even further.
For analytical purposes, these could be broken down into the following
sub-issues: (1) whether the phrase to prosecute persons bearing greatest
responsibility established a jurisdictional threshold or was a type of
guidance for the prosecutor’s determination of whom to prosecute; (2) if
so, the timing or stage of the proceedings during which an accused
should raise the objection that the tribunal lacks authority to try him
because he did not bear greatest responsibility; (3) the evidentiary
burden that the defense would have to discharge if they chose to raise
the issue (and the nature of the prosecution’s burden to counter it);
(4) the role of the evidence and judges in the assessment of greatest
responsibility; and, finally, (5) the consequences of positive or negative
findings on jurisdiction for the defendant, the prosecutor, and the
tribunal itself. For space reasons, the next part of this Article will only
take up analysis of the first of these five issues.
83. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion,
¶ 27.
84. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (July 20, 2007).
85. Compare Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence
Motion, ¶¶ 23–27, with Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶¶ 30–34 (Mar. 31, 2006).
86. See, e.g., Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion, ¶¶ 28–29.
87. Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
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B. Greatest Responsibility as a Jurisdictional Requirement
In the first defense motion to raise the argument that the SCSL was
not entitled to try a particular defendant because it lacked the legal
88
capacity or power to do so, the assigned counsel for Moinina Fofana
filed a preliminary jurisdictional challenge before Trial Chamber I on
89
November 17, 2003. The counsel submitted that the court did not have
personal jurisdiction over Fofana because the suspect fell outside the
category of persons who bore “the greatest responsibility” for the
alleged serious international humanitarian law violations contained in
90
his indictment.
The defense asserted that the personal jurisdiction discussed in
Article 1(1) of the tribunal statute could be interpreted in one of two
91
ways. First, as a reference to the leaders of the parties or states bearing
the greatest responsibility for the Sierra Leonean armed conflict,
92
including those who had threatened the peace process. Second, and
alternatively, as a way of referring to those individuals responsible for
93
most of the crimes committed during the armed conflict. According to
the defense, neither Fofana’s indictment nor the subsequent
prosecution’s disclosure of evidence supported the view that Fofana
94
Indeed, under neither
belonged to the latter class of persons.
88. Moinina Fofana held the rank as the National Director of War of the CDF, the
armed state-supported militia faction involved in the Sierra Leone conflict. See Norman,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion, ¶ 42; Prosecutor v.
Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction, ¶ 14 (Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-03-11Fofana/SCSL-03-11-PT-062.pdf.
89. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Preliminary Defence Motion.
90. Id. ¶ 2. Rule 72B of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides:
Preliminary motions by the accused are (i) objections based on lack of jurisdiction;
(ii) objections based on defects in the form of the indictment; (iii) applications for
severance of crimes joined in one indictment Rule 49, or for separate trials under
Rule 82(B); (iv) objections based on the denial of request for assignment of counsel;
or (v) objections based on abuse of process.
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rules of Procedure and Evidence (amended Mar. 7, 2003),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=1YNrqhd4L5s%3D&tabid=70.
The Rules further provide that “[o]bjections based on lack of jurisdiction or to the form of
the indictment, including an amended indictment, shall be raised by a party in one motion
only, unless otherwise allowed by the Trial Chamber.” Id. at 72C.
91. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion,
¶ 2.
92. Id. ¶ 2(a).
93. Id. ¶ 2(b).
94. Id. ¶ 2.
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interpretation could he be deemed among those bearing greatest
responsibility and therefore properly within the court’s personal
jurisdiction.
The prosecution responded that the documents forming the context
for the establishment of the SCSL amply showed that the question
whether a particular person is one of those who bore the greatest
responsibility was a matter of prosecutorial discretion based on the
95
evidence collected during the investigations. To justify judicial review
of the exercise of that discretion, the defendant needed to demonstrate
that the prosecutor unlawfully exercised his power or acted based on
96
improper or impermissible discriminatory motives. The accused had
97
failed to adduce any proof establishing such intentions. According to
the prosecution, although defense counsel had suggested that Fofana
was associated with the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) militia that was
known more for its work in attempting to restore peace in Sierra Leone,
rather than the commission of international crimes, this was not
substantiation that he might not ultimately be found among those
98
bearing greatest responsibility. Fofana was, in any event, a leader
fitting that description since he had been the second in command of the
99
CDF organization, as had been alleged in his indictment.
In its unanimous ruling, Trial Chamber I reviewed the drafting
history of the provision and correspondence between the U.N.
Secretary-General and the Security Council discussing “greatest
responsibility” and the former’s proposed alternative to use those “most
100
responsible” instead. The judges rightly pointed out that the UNSC’s
preference was to limit the jurisdiction of the SCSL primarily to the
101
prosecution of those who had played a leadership role. But the UNSG
had insisted that the greatest responsibility clause should not be taken to
imply that personal jurisdiction would only be limited to the political

95. Id. ¶ 5; see also Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Prosecution Response to the
Defence Preliminary Motion on Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, ¶ 6 (Nov. 26, 2003), available
at
http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-03-11-Fofana/SCSL-03-11-PT-074/SCSL-03-11-PT074-I.pdf.
96. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2003-11-PT, Prosecution Response, ¶ 12–14.
97. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion,
¶ 7.
98. Id. ¶ 8.
99. Id. ¶ 10.
100. Id. ¶ 40.
101. Id.
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102

and military leaders. He argued that it would also extend to others on
103
the basis of the scale or severity of their crimes.
After this review,
Trial Chamber I unanimously concluded that “the issue of personal
jurisdiction is a jurisdictional requirement, and while it does of course
guide the prosecutorial strategy, it does not exclusively articulate
104
prosecutorial discretion, as the prosecution has submitted.”
Having essentially determined that Article 1(1) established a
jurisdictional threshold, which the prosecution ought to show it could
fulfill, the judges ruled that the prosecution had discharged that burden
105
in the context of that particular case. They were satisfied that Fofana
appeared to fall within the court’s personal jurisdiction because there
was sufficient prima facie evidence tending to show that he held a
leadership position as the number two person in the CDF—one of the
106
They underscored,
main parties in Sierra Leone’s armed conflict.
however, that whether or not he could be found to be among those
holding greatest responsibility is a factual and “an evidentiary matter to
107
be determined at the trial stage.” The chamber clarified that, at the
stage of the defense’s preliminary motion, it was merely concerned with
108
basic allegations. It therefore correctly underscored that it was not, in
reaching this finding, pronouncing Fofana’s final guilt or innocence,
109
which would only be adjudged after the conclusion of his trial.
In their judgment on the merits, which followed several years later,
Trial Chamber I reiterated its initial holding that Article 1(1) created a
110
jurisdictional requirement. However, although the judges had (at the
preliminary motions stage) deferred the question of whether Fofana was
in actuality one of those bearing greatest responsibility until the end of
the trial (because such assessment could only follow after hearing all the
evidence against the accused), it appeared to sidestep the issue. It
reasoned that the personal jurisdiction requirement did not constitute a
102. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/2001/40 (Jan. 12,
2001) [hereinafter Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General].
103. Id. paras. 2–3.
104. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion,
¶ 27.
105. Id. ¶ 45.
106. Id. ¶ 42.
107. Id. ¶ 44.
108. Id.
109. Id. ¶ 47.
110. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 91–92 (Aug. 2, 2007).
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legal or material ingredient of the crimes. It followed that the
prosecutor did not need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Fofana was one of those in fact bearing greatest responsibility in order
to secure a conviction.
Put differently, at the judgment stage when it decided Fofana was
actually guilty, the trial chamber implied that it had accepted the
prosecutor’s conclusion that the defendant was one of those in fact
bearing greatest responsibility for what happened in Sierra Leone. This
suggests that it saw the assessment of whether personal jurisdiction
existed to try Fofana as being only a relevant question for consideration
at the indictment review stage on a standard of reasonable basis to
believe, as opposed to a matter to be put to prosecutorial proof beyond
a reasonable doubt during or at the completion of the trial.
Two other observations seem pertinent about Trial Chamber I’s
analysis of the greatest responsibility in Article 1(1). First, it helpfully
clarified that the clause should essentially be understood as expressing
two separate, if closely related, ideas. To begin with, the phrase
confirmed that the prosecution of persons who bear the greatest
responsibility constituted a personal jurisdictional requirement before
the court and that it is the prosecutor’s function in carrying out the
111
This meant that the
mandate that is then prescribed in Article 15.
prosecution must establish that a particular suspect fulfilled this
criterion by tendering evidence, assessed at the low reasonable basis to
believe indictment review threshold, that the person was a leader
(whether military or political) appearing to be one of those bearing
greatest responsibility. If the prosecution meets the burden—which
would not be difficult because the threshold is very low—of having
reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect in question committed
the crime charged, then the chamber can properly try the defendant.
Conversely, if the prosecution failed to prove even a prima facie case
against the suspect, showing that the court has jurisdiction over him
covering particular crimes on a given territory during an appropriate
time period, then the chamber would have to dismiss the case. The
court’s logic was likely that the suspect did not need to endure an
unnecessary trial when the SCSL lacked the basic personal, temporal
and subject matter jurisdiction to try him.
A related point is that, unlike the first part of Article 1(1) of the
111. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion,
¶¶ 21, 26, 27.
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SCSL Statute, the chamber implied that the second part of the same
sentence, “including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have
threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace
112
process in Sierra Leone[,]” was not an element of the crime. Rather, it
was intended to serve as a type of guideline to the prosecutor in his
113
determination of his strategy regarding whom to prosecute.
The
judges illustrated that the practical focus of who to investigate and try
from the perspective of the Council during the negotiations were the
114
important political and military leaders; whereas, from SecretaryGeneral Annan’s perspective, it would include the top leaders plus
anyone else that was found to be among those who carried out the worst
115
of the crimes perpetrated in Sierra Leone.
Second, Trial Chamber I seemed to confirm the interpretation that
the phrase those “who bear the greatest responsibility” was sufficiently
flexible phraseology to capture (1) all those who held high ranking
positions and (2) those whose crimes were so cruel that they would be
among the worst perpetrators of the mayhem during the Sierra Leone
116
The caveat, of course, was that the judges unanimously,
Civil War.
and correctly in my view, determined that the UNSC clearly stated
preference for the “greatest responsibility” language signaled that the
leadership role of the suspect should be the primary consideration with
the severity of a crime and its massive nature bearing only secondary
117
importance to the decision.
Overall, when assessed using the language of the three-part
interpretive scheme suggested above, the Trial Chamber I judges
concluded that Fofana fell within the political-military leader category
instead of the killer-perpetrator category, the former being the main
criterion that presumably guided his prosecutorial indictment. In fact, in
its judgment on the merits, Trial Chamber I found that Fofana was one
of the top three men in the so-called Holy Trinity of the CDF
organization. It underscored, much like the founders of the SCSL did
during the negotiations of the constitutive instruments, that greatest
responsibility should, at least partly, be understood as a reflection of
112. Id. ¶ 38.
113. Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 27.
114. Id. ¶¶ 22–25.
115. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 102, para. 2.
116. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence
Motion, ¶ 39.
117. Id. at ¶ 40.
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rank or position of the suspect in the organization(s) that perpetrated
the crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the international
118
tribunal. This point, therefore, seems like a helpful clarification to the
jurisprudence and the literature on personal jurisdiction in international
criminal courts.
C. Greatest Responsibility as a Guideline for Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) Case, which was
heard by the judges of Trial Chamber II, involved three mutinying
soldiers from the Sierra Leone Army who organized a coup d’etat that
119
unseated the democratically elected Kabbah government. Once they
assumed power, the three suspects directed others within their
command and control to commit some of the most brutal acts witnessed
120
during the Sierra Leone conflict. Unlike the Fofana case, none of the
three defense teams in the AFRC joint trial filed preliminary challenges
objecting to the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over their
clients during the limited twenty-one day period following the release of
the prosecution disclosure under the SCSL Rules of Procedure and
121
It is unclear whether this was just an oversight or a
Evidence.
deliberate defense strategy. However, at the halfway point of the trial
when the prosecution had rested its case-in-chief, the defendants
addressed the issue as part of their no case to answer or motion for
122
judgment of acquittal submissions.
For example, Brima contended that the reference in Article 1(1) and
15 of the SCSL Statute to persons who bear the greatest responsibility
was a “limitation on the Court’s jurisdiction as to which persons may or
may not be prosecuted and creates an evidentiary burden to be satisfied
123
by the Prosecution.” According to the defense, the prosecutor had not
discharged his burden because its witnesses instead showed that other

118. See id. ¶¶ 38–40.
119. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 4, 316, 432, 507 (June
20, 2007).
120. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 233–39.
121. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion;
Rules of Procedure and Evidence Rule 72(A), supra note 90.
122. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Joint Legal Part Defence Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal Under Rule 98, ¶¶ 1–2 (Dec. 13, 2005).
123. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶ 28 (March 31, 2006).
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more prominent military leaders higher in rank, not their accused clients
who were only lower ranked non-commissioned officers, bore greatest
124
responsibility for the heinous offenses perpetrated in Sierra Leone. In
its response, the prosecution made a two-pronged argument. First,
there was no jurisdictional threshold that had to be met under Article
1(1). Second, the question of whether an accused is among those who
bears greatest responsibility ought to only be determined after the
125
conclusion of the trial. Alternatively, and in any event, based on the
evidence presented up to that point in the trial, a reasonable trier of fact
could have found the accused to fall within the court’s personal
126
jurisdiction.
In its judgment, Trial Chamber II reviewed the documents discussing
the history of the personal jurisdiction provision; in particular, it
examined two letters exchanged between the UNSG and the Council in
127
The chamber correctly observed that in the January 12, 2001
2001.
letter, the UNSC rejected Annan’s preferred “most responsible”
personal jurisdiction language in favor or retaining its own “‘greatest
128
The Secretary-General had insisted on
responsibility’ formulation.”
clarifying that the greatest responsibility should not be taken to mean
that the court’s personal jurisdiction was limited to “political and
military leaders” only, a position which the Council subsequently
129
appeared to approve in its January 31, 2001 reply. This SCSL chamber
found that “greatest responsibility” personal jurisdiction “solely
130
purports to streamline the focus of prosecutorial strategy.” The judges
observed that the phrase, understood in its ordinary sense, was intended
to include, at a minimum, two groups of perpetrators, at the top of
which were the political and military leaders of the parties to the
131
conflict. They emphasized, nevertheless, that the broad language used
in the provision implied that an even wider range of individuals,
presumably including ordinary combatants whose conduct might have
been very egregious, were all potentially prosecutable before the

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. ¶ 29.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (June 20, 2007) (emphasis added).
Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion, ¶¶ 34–35.
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132

court.
It seems apparent but surprising that, in reaching two diverging
conclusions, the two sets of judges in each of the SCSL trial chambers
examined the same drafting history and historical documents. While
they agreed on the importance of those documents and relied on the
analysis contained therein, each chamber’s legal reasoning towards their
133
respective conclusions differed.
The question is, why? Two reasons
stand out. First, it would seem that the judges of Trial Chamber II did
not read in their entirety either the drafting history of Article 1(1) and
the subsequent correspondence between Secretary-General Annan and
the Council. After the Secretary-General’s January 12, 2001 letter
proposing that the Council switch from its preferred, but apparently
narrower, “greatest responsibility” formulation to his alternative and
purportedly wider “most responsible” standard for personal jurisdiction,
he conceded that, in rejecting his alternative proposal, the Council was
thus “limiting the focus of the Special Court to those who played a
134
He pled, however, that the phrase should not be
leadership role.”
construed to “mean that the personal jurisdiction is limited to the
135
political and military leaders only.”
Indeed, in his view, this
determination in a concrete case would initially have to be made by the
prosecutor and, ultimately, by the court itself. The President of the
Council, in a somewhat ambiguous, subsequent reply, stated that the
UNSC shared in the Secretary-General’s “analysis of the importance
136
and role of the phrase ‘persons who bear the greatest responsibility.’”
Second, Trial Chamber I introduced a nuance when it reached the
conclusion that greatest responsibility was both a jurisdictional
requirement in Article 1(1) and also a description of the prosecutorial
duty as fleshed out in Article 15. This group of judges emphasized the
second part of the January 12, 2001, letter from the Secretary-General
to the Council, in which it accepted that the particular reference made in
the second sentence of Article 1(1) would then explicitly encompass
“those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
132. See id. ¶ 35.
133. Compare id. ¶¶ 32–34, with Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT,
Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on
Behalf of Accused Fofana, ¶¶ 22–25 (Mar. 3, 2004).
134. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 102, para. 2; see also
Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 30–31.
135. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 102, para. 2.
136. Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 20, para. 1.
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establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra
137
Leone.” Secretary-General Annan understood the second sentence to
serve as “guidance to the Prosecutor in determining his or her
138
prosecutorial strategy.” The UNSC, in a subsequent reply to him, also
endorsed that clarification that the words in the second sentence of
Article 1(1), following the comma, were intended as a type of guideline
139
This gave credence to the later
to frame the prosecutorial strategy.
Trial Chamber I position that the effect of that preference for the
greatest responsibility, instead of the people most responsible language,
meant that leadership, instead of severity of the crime, ought to be the
140
primary consideration when determining which suspect to prosecute.
In other words, even though the two trial chambers used two
different routes and Trial Chamber I felt that leadership, as a criterion,
was to have primacy over severity, the judges from both chambers were
on essentially the same page that greatest responsibility as phrased in
the statute meant that both political military leaders as well as killerperpetrators could be prosecuted. But Trial Chamber I correctly
distinguished between the first sentence of Article 1(1) (which it read as
outlining the personal jurisdiction) and the second sentence (which put
in place the criteria—later explicitly developed in Article 15—that
would serve to guide or circumscribe prosecutorial discretion towards a
141
Whereas, for its part,
particular class of obstructionist individuals).
Trial Chamber II interpreted the second part of the phrase in Article
1(1) as being subsumed by the first and reasoned that both elements,
taken as one, did not establish a jurisdictional requirement, but rather, it
142
In
functioned as additional guidance for the prosecutor’s strategy.
other words, to the latter group of judges, Article 1(1) was not a
jurisdictional clause as much as it was a guidance clause. However, the
Trial Chamber II ruling appears hard to reconcile with the fact that the
rest of the elements in Article 1(1) of the Statute explicitly referred to
matters of (geographic, territorial, and temporal) jurisdiction only. The
decision also failed to plausibly explain why the same “greatest
137. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion,
¶¶ 38, 40.
138. Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 20, para. 1.
139. Id.
140. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion,
¶¶ 39–40.
141. Id.
142. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (June 20, 2007).
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responsibility” language separately found its way into Article 15, which
stated the functions of the prosecutor.
As we will see presently, when the Appeals Chamber confronted this
same question, it adopted lock-stock-and-barrel the Trial Chamber II
reasoning that greatest responsibility, as worded in Article 1(1) of the
SCSL Statute, was solely a guideline to the prosecutor for the exercise
of his discretion instead of a jurisdictional requirement. It is submitted
that this conclusion, which effectively endorsed the faulty prosecution
and Trial Chamber II reasoning, was not necessarily borne out by the
143
travaux préparatoires of the SCSL’s founding instruments.
D. The Appeals Chamber Weighs In
Because the two trial chambers of the court had disagreed on the
interpretation of “greatest responsibility,” it fell to the Appeals
Chamber to break the tie and furnish an authoritative interpretation of
the clause once and for all. Santigie Borbor Kanu, the third defendant
in the Brima trial, raised greatest responsibility as his first ground in the
appeal of his conviction. He claimed that the trial court erred when it
failed to establish its proper jurisdiction over him pursuant to Article
144
In assessing his plea, the Appeals Chamber first distinguished
1(1).
separation of power issues relating to the competence of the court, its
organizational structure, and the role of the prosecutor as set out in the
145
SCSL Statute vis-à-vis the chambers.
To begin, it assessed the role of the prosecutor set out in Article
146
15. It then observed that, flowing from that rule, he is mandated to act
as “a separate organ” and is therefore barred from seeking or receiving
147
instructions from any government or from any other source.
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber concluded, “[i]t is evident that it is
the prosecutor who has the responsibility and competence to determine
who are to be prosecuted as a result of investigation undertaken by
148
him.” It is then up to the chambers, as the adjudicative organ, to “try
143. See Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence
Motion, ¶ 40.
144. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Kanu’s Submissions to Grounds of Appeal,
¶¶ 1.1–.30 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl/Public/SCSL-0416%20AFRC%20APPEAL%20DOCS/SCSL-04-16-A-647%20A.pdf.
145. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 280–81.
146. Id.
147. Id. ¶ 280 (emphasis omitted).
148. Id. ¶ 281.
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such persons who the prosecutor has consequently brought before it as
149
persons who bear the greatest responsibility.” Put more succinctly, the
decision as to whether someone bears greatest responsibility is made by
the prosecutor, during his investigations, and is not one for the judges
whose sole function it is to adjudicate the individual cases brought
before them.
This position is correct insofar as it demarcates the sharp division of
responsibilities between the prosecutorial and judicial organs of the
court. But, while generally true, this separation of powers logic should
not be taken too far. Indeed, as offered by the appeals court, this
general argument is insufficient to dispose of the specific question of
who can and should determine who has greatest responsibility for
prosecutions before the court. Neither did it resolve the question
whether the language is a jurisdictional threshold or only some type of
prosecutorial guidance. The result reveals errors in the judicial
reasoning. For example, Trial Chamber II had similarly reasoned that,
because of the separation of the prosecutorial and judicial roles in the
court’s founding instrument, Article 15 of the Statute even implied that
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in bringing a case against a
150
This was a
particular accused was not reviewable by the court.
broader finding than even the prosecutor would have expected. In fact,
he had conceded in the briefing process, both at trial and during the
appeal, that a discretionary decision in choosing whom to prosecute is
reviewable by the judges if exercised in a manifestly unreasonable
manner, for instance, by violating the rights of the accused through
abuse of process or where the power is exercised for impermissible or
151
discriminatory motives.
In a nutshell then, both the Appeals Chamber and Trial Chamber
II’s interpretation of Article 1(1), as a whole, was that the language
delineated the outer boundaries of how far the prosecutor can go when
exercising her discretion. There are obvious difficulties with this
conclusion, which the judges did not address in either the trial or
appellate decisions. Among other issues, this stance ignores why a
traditional jurisdictional provision setting out the competence of an ad
149. Id.
150. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgement, ¶ 654.
151. Id. ¶ 643; Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Decision on Defence Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98, ¶ 29 (Mar. 31, 2006); Prosecutor v. Norman, Case
No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana, ¶ 7 (Mar. 3, 2004).
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hoc international criminal court would be adopted by the framers of a
statute only to be reduced to a simple guideline for prosecutorial policy
at a later time. A related concern is that the judges did not speak to the
obvious link between Article 1(1), which usually enumerates the
personal jurisdiction of the tribunal, with Article 15(1), which defined
the power of the prosecutor, when it provided that he or she shall be
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of persons who bear
the greatest responsibility for the crimes committed in Sierra Leone
after November 30, 1996. In other words, why would the drafters adopt
Article 15(1) if Article 1(1) serves essentially the same purpose?
Conversely, why would they include Article 1(1) if Article 15(1)
sufficiently described both the court’s jurisdiction and the mandate of
the prosecutor? The answer is that they adopted each of these separate
provisions because each played a distinctive role in the statute: the
former setting out the jurisdiction of the court and the latter outlining
the functions and limitations imposed on the prosecutor and his exercise
of his power.
In Kanu’s appeal, the prosecution had further argued that the
Appeals Chamber should not hold the phrase “persons who bear the
greatest responsibility” as a test criterion or a distinct jurisdictional
152
To do so, according to the prosecution, would lead to an
threshold.
153
“absurd interpretation” requiring a factual determination at the pretrial stage that there is no person who has been indicted who bears
greater responsibility than the particular accused when it would be
impossible to determine the precise scope of criminal liability before the
trial concludes. Yet, at the same time, it would be “unworkable to
suggest that this determination should be made by the Trial or Appeals
154
Chamber at the end of the trial.” By analogy to Article 1 of the ICTY
and ICTR Statutes, which provide for prosecution of “persons
responsible,” the prosecution submitted that construing “greatest
responsibility” as a jurisdictional requirement would imply that those
155
other tribunals could only prosecute those who are actually guilty.
Adopting the prosecution’s line of argument, the Appeals Chamber,
in a crucial statement that betrayed the real issue underpinning the
court’s conclusion, ruled as follows:
152.
153.
154.
155.

Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 274–75.
Id. ¶ 274.
Id.
Id.
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[I]t is inconceivable that after a long and expensive trial the Trial
Chamber could conclude that although the commission of
serious crimes has been established beyond reasonable doubt
against the accused, the indictment ought to be struck out on the
ground that it has not been proved that the accused was not one
156
of those who bore the greatest responsibility.
With respect, the Appeals Chamber, like Trial Chamber II, which
first accepted this reasoning, fell into analytical error. For one thing, it
assumes that a determination that greatest responsibility was a personal
jurisdiction requirement implied that the judges had to find at the pretrial stage, in violation of the presumption of innocence and before even
hearing any evidence, that there is no other person that bore greater
responsibility than the particular accused before the court. For another
thing, without referring to the prosecution evidence, it suggests that the
case would not necessarily have been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Both these propositions seem untenable. The better view
appears to be that advanced by Trial Chamber I, which held in its
Fofana preliminary decision that an assessment of whether someone can
be said to bear greatest responsibility could be handled differently by
assessing, during the indictment review stage, whether the prosecution
had made out a prima facie case that a particular suspect appears to be
one of the individuals bearing greatest responsibility for what happened
157
in a particular armed conflict. If there is basic evidence supporting the
prosecution’s case, then the trial would proceed, much like it would with
respect to the other jurisdictional criteria that had to be met, for
example, convincing the judges that the suspect appears to have
158
committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the SCSL. Another
possibility is for the greatest responsibility issue to be considered at the
Rule 98 (no case to answer) stage, when the judges would have heard all
the evidence from the prosecution. They could then decide, on the
standard reflecting that stage of the process, if there was substantial
evidence that—if believed—would appear to support the charges in the
indictment such as to put the defendant to answer the prosecution case
made up to that point of the trial.

156. Id. ¶ 283.
157. Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 91–92 (Aug. 2, 2007).
158. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary
Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana,
¶¶ 28–45 (Mar. 3, 2004).
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More fundamentally, the Appeals Chamber, in endorsing the
prosecutor’s argument, failed to distinguish between the ICTY and the
ICTR, both of which were differently situated vis-à-vis the SCSL.
Among other things, the question of personal jurisdiction did not arise
in the UN twin tribunals in the way it did at the Sierra Leone court, nor
did it bear the same type of import, because those other ad hoc courts
were not saddled with the same explicit limitations on their jurisdiction
or on the powers of the prosecutor as was the SCSL.
The crucial question arises whether the drafting history of the
Statute of the SCSL reflected the position taken by the Appeals
Chamber and Trial Chamber II. In the next part of this paper, I will
argue that the Appeals Chamber misconstrued Article 1 of the Statute.
I submit that, clouded by its concern for the practicalities of finding
differently on the personal jurisdiction provision for the concrete cases
before them, the appeals court misinterpreted the provision. I will
contend that Trial Chamber I, which methodically reviewed the greatest
responsibility formula with closer and more complete reference to the
drafting history, more accurately reflected the intention of the drafters
of the SCSL Statute. That intention was that Article 1(1) would
establish the personal jurisdiction of the court, while Article 15(1) would
further circumscribe the discretion of the prosecutor to pursue only a
limited class of suspects deemed to bear greatest responsibility.
Ultimately, as I have argued in this paper, despite their various
differences, the overall conclusion to draw from the Sierra Leone court
case law seems to be that the greatest responsibility language was
sufficiently broad to ensure that the tribunal could prosecute individuals
from both the political-leader and the killer-perpetrator groups. That
much agreement existed between most if not all of the judges, even if
their reasoning towards that conclusion differed.
IV. DISCERNING THE ACTUAL MEANING OF “GREATEST
RESPONSIBILITY”
The drafting history of Article 1(1) in the Statute of the SCSL
supports the argument that at least part of the provision was initially
intended as a jurisdictional requirement, while another part of the
provision was intended as a sort of redline not to cross or guideline to
limit the prosecutorial strategy. An examination of the ordinary textual
meaning of the provisions, in accordance with Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties demonstrates this theory. Article
31, in relevant part, provides that:
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1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
[Emphasis added].
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes . . .
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context . . .
4. [Any] special meaning given to a term if it is established
159
that the parties so intended.
As the agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra
160
Article 31 of the Vienna
Leone constitutes a bilateral treaty,
161
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is applicable. The Statute
of the court, which of course contains the identical provision on personal
jurisdiction, is an annex to the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and
162
therefore forms an integral part of the treaty. The ordinary meaning
of the phrase “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility” in Article 1(1) of those two instruments can therefore be
read in light of the context; as well as the preamble, object, and purpose
of the provision and the statute; the court’s intended role to ensure
accountability for international crimes committed in Sierra Leone; and
the special meaning accorded to the term by the founders of the SCSL
as well as in light of the tribunal’s actual practice.
A. The Ordinary Meaning of “Persons Who Bear the Greatest
Responsibility”
Let us examine, using a standard English dictionary, each of the
terms in the phrase “to prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility.” The Oxford English Dictionary defines “person” in
various ways. For our purposes the most relevant is the following: “an
individual human being; a man, woman or child;” and, as used in a
technical legal sense, as “[a] human being (natural person) or body

159. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (emphasis added).
160. See Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 9.
161. Vienna Convention, supra note 159, art. 1.
162. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1,
art. 1.

11 JALLOH (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

4/13/2013 5:12 PM

GREATEST RESPONSIBILITY

899

corporate or corporation (artificial person), having rights and duties
163
recognized by the law.” It is clear from even the ordinary dictionary
meaning that the term “person” refers most likely to a natural person.
So far, all the SCSL prosecutions have related to natural persons,
although there is nothing to foreclose trials of legal persons. That said,
in the context of this particular Article, this issue does not appear to
have a major bearing on the argument here so it need not detain us.
The noun “who” is used “[a]s the ordinary interrogative pronoun, in
the nominative singular or plural, used of a person or persons:
164
More specifically, it is “[a]s
corresponding to what of things.”
compound relative in the nominative in general or indefinite sense: Any
165
one that . . . .”
The term “bear,” which is the root word for “bearing,” means “to
166
carry; to sustain; to thrust, press; to bring forth.” Bearing is therefore
“the action of carrying or conveying” or “[t]he carrying of oneself (with
reference to the manner); carriage, deportment; behaviour,
167
demeanour.”
Of course, “the” is a definite article. As used in Article 1(1) of the
SCSL Statute outlining the personal jurisdiction, it modifies or rather
particularizes the superlative “greatest” as a way of connoting that the
tribunal is or should be most concerned. It thus essentially captures the
notion of individuals that belong to a class or group of persons bearing
relatively greater responsibility, although, admittedly, the idea of those
with which it should be most concerned does not necessarily imply
exclusivity.
“Greatest” is, of course, the “superlative of great in various
168
As used ordinarily, “the greatest” is a reference to “[t]hat
senses.”
which is great; great things, aspects, qualities, etc. collectively; also, great
169
quantity, large amount.” When used to describe persons who bear the
qualities of “being great,” the Oxford English Dictionary clarifies that it
is an allusion to persons “[e]minent by reason of birth, rank, wealth,
power, or position; of high social or official position; of eminent rank or

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 597 (2nd ed. 1989) (emphasis omitted).
20 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 288–89 (2nd ed. 1989).
Id. at 289.
2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 20 (2nd ed. 1989).
Id. at 26.
6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 801 (2nd ed. 1989).
Id. at 800 (footnote omitted).
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170

place.” Greatest is, more helpfully in our context, an additional way of
denoting “conditions, actions, or occurrences; with reference to degree
or extent . . . . [and of] things, actions, [or] events . . . [o]f more than
ordinary importance, weight, or distinction; important, weighty;
171
distinguished, prominent; famous, renowned.”
As to “responsibility,” it is defined as “[t]he state or fact of being
responsible . . . for . . . [a] charge, trust, or duty, for which one is
172
responsible.”
From the above definitions, we can distill from the ordinary
dictionary meaning of each of the words when combined together and
viewed in their context, that the phrase “persons who bear the greatest
responsibility” is a description of two separate but not entirely distinct
ideas. First, it describes a person of high rank, position, or power who
carries out certain actions and brings forth events or conditions of more
than ordinary importance, and for which, given the core purpose of the
SCSL to administer justice, the tribunal should investigate and
prosecute the individual.
Second, and flowing from the above definitions, we can also see that
the ordinary meaning of the phrase is also a reference to the degree or
amount of something or event that a person engages upon as part of a
certain type of behavior—in this case, the commission of crimes during
the course of the Sierra Leone armed conflict. Individual criminal
liability was rightly deemed necessary for those actions or events. It also
reveals the state or fact of being in charge of or of having a duty or
obligation towards a person or thing, which was then breached by those
persons who fall within the personal jurisdiction of the court. A
reference to the drafting history will demonstrate that these two
ordinary definitions of the personal jurisdiction provision were also
expressed during the negotiations of the agreement creating the SCSL.
As argued above, and as will be further detailed in the next section,
focusing specifically on the drafting history, the category of persons over
which the court was to have jurisdiction was always going to be limited.
The Council’s preference was evidently that the leadership role or
command authority of a suspect should be the principal criterion for the
173
application of the greatest responsibility formulation. Whereas, the
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 797.
Id. (formatting omitted).
13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 742 (2nd ed. 1989).
U.N. President of the S.C., Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from the President of the
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Secretary-General’s view was that the gravity, scale or massive nature of
the crime should also be taken into account, if not the main
174
consideration, for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Bear in mind
that while the former seemingly endorsed the juxtaposition of these two
separate ideas, according to Trial Chamber I, the Council ultimately saw
the scale or gravity of a particular crime as being of secondary, instead
of primary, importance vis-à-vis the leadership or functional positions
175
held by the suspects.
B. The Drafting History of “Persons Who Bear Greatest Responsibility”
Under Article 31(2) of the VCLT, in addition to the preamble and
annexes, the context for a treaty is additionally comprised of any
subsequent agreements relating to the treaty made between all the
176
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.
The four paragraphs of the preamble to the UN-Sierra Leone
Agreement refer to Security Council Resolution 1315, adopted on
August 14, 2000, in which the Council expressed deep concern at the
very serious crimes committed within the “territory of Sierra Leone
against the people of Sierra Leone and United Nations and associated
177
personnel and at the prevailing situation of impunity.”
It therefore
asked the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Sierra
Leone government to “create an independent special court to prosecute
persons who bear the greatest responsibility” for the commission of the
178
serious international and Sierra Leonean law violations committed.
The same language contained in the resolution was reiterated
verbatim in Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute, which prescribed the
competence of the court and delimited its core jurisdictional
179
components.
In the Statute, as opposed to Agreement, however, a
clarification was added to the effect of “including those leaders who, in
Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234 (Dec.
22, 2000) [hereinafter Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from Pres. of S.C.].
174. See Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 30.
175. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary
Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana,
¶ 40 (Mar. 3, 2004).
176. Vienna Convention, supra note 159, art. 31(2).
177. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, pmbl.; see also U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra
note 1, pmbl.
178. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 1; see also U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra
note 1, pmbl.
179. SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1); S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 3.
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committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and
180
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”
Besides the
181
text of those two instruments, the travaux préparatoires reveal a
subsequent discussion between, on the one hand, internal organs of the
U.N. (the Security Council and the Secretary-General), and on the other
hand, the U.N. as a single entity vis-à-vis the other party (Sierra Leone).
In Resolution 1315, the UNSC directed the Secretary-General that
the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal shall cover only “persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes” in Sierra
182
Leone.
As the Secretary-General later tried to explain, the Council
intended that phrase to mean two things, which also appear to coincide
with the ordinary dictionary meaning discerned in the previous
183
section.
In his Report to the Security Council explaining the steps he had
taken to implement Resolution 1315, the Secretary-General suggested
that an alternative phrase, “persons most responsible,” replace “greatest
184
responsibility.” Secretary-General Annan rationalized this suggestion
as follows:
While those “most responsible” obviously include the political or
military leadership, others in command authority down the chain
of command may also be regarded “most responsible” judging by
the severity of the crime or its massive scale.
“Most
responsible[,]” therefore, denotes either a leadership or
authority position of the accused, and a sense of the gravity,
seriousness or massive scale of the crime. It must be seen,
however, not as a test criterion or a distinct jurisdictional
threshold, but as a guidance to the Prosecutor in the adoption of
a prosecution strategy and in making decisions to prosecute in
185
individual cases.
However, the Council did not endorse that proposal because, for one
thing, it implicitly disagreed that the phrase “those most responsible”

180. Compare SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1), with U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement,
supra note 1, art. 1(1).
181. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
182. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 3.
183. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 30; see also Letter dated Jan.
12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 105, paras. 2–3.
184. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 29–31.
185. Id. ¶ 30.
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was broader than the phrase those “bearing greatest responsibility.”
The President of the Security Council, in a December 22, 2000 letter,
rejected the Secretary-General’s proposed modification to the personal
187
jurisdiction provision. The UNSC reiterated its preference contained
in Resolution 1315 that jurisdiction should extend to only those persons
who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes under
188
national and international law. He put it as follows: “The members of
the Security Council believe that, by thus limiting the focus of the
Special Court to those who played a leadership role, the simpler and
more general formulations suggested in the appended draft will be
189
appropriate.” It seems apparent enough, then, that the Council’s main
interest was to hone in on those holding a leadership role, as the judges
of Trial Chamber I have also confirmed.
In the Secretary-General’s response to the President of the Security
Council, which followed about three weeks later (January 12, 2001), he
190
canvassed the difference between the two positions. He then tried to
reframe his argument to again reassert the relevance of the gravity, scale
and severity of the crimes—a point that he had initially made when he
suggested that “the term ‘most responsible’ would not necessarily
exclude children between 15 and 18 years of age” from possible
191
The question
responsibility for crimes within the SCSL jurisdiction.
surrounding the responsibility of child soldiers, who had been some of
the most notorious perpetrators of atrocities during the war, was one of
192
So the
the thorniest issues for the Sierra Leonean negotiators.
Secretary-General effectively used that issue as a trump card to
emphasize why the gravity of the crimes is a vital consideration in
addition to the functional (leadership) position held by the suspect. He
wrote in his report, as follows:
While it is inconceivable that children could be in a political or
military leadership position (although in Sierra Leone the rank
of “Brigadier” was often granted to children as young as 11
years), the gravity and seriousness of the crimes they have

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 173.
Id.
Id. para. 1; see S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 14, ¶ 3.
Letter dated Dec. 22, 2000 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 174, para. 1.
Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 103, para. 1–2.
Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶ 31.
Id. ¶ 34.
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allegedly committed would allow for their inclusion within the
193
jurisdiction of the Court.
With hindsight, we know that the evidence that came out of the trials
never supported this contention. However, the foregoing extract does
indicate that at least one of the negotiators, the UNSG, intended the
gravity of the conduct to be a crucial element of greatest responsibility
personal jurisdiction. The above implicitly accepts that the Council’s
purpose in framing jurisdiction this way was to limit the prosecutorial
investigations to those in leadership position. Going by the reasoning of
Trial Chamber I, which discerned this singular thrust that leadership was
or should be the determinative criterion for prosecutorial decisions, the
massive nature of the crime could and should also be taken into
account—albeit as a secondary factor. If this deduction is correct, and it
does seem not only correct but also reasonable, it would permit the
prosecution of either, or both, of the lower ranked perpetrators in
addition to leaders in the same jurisdiction.
In fact, in the same report, one might also recall, Secretary-General
Annan had claimed that the wording of Article 1(1) of the draft statute,
as the Security Council had proposed it, did “not mean [to limit]
194
personal jurisdiction . . . to the political and military leaders only.”
Almost as a tie breaker in case the powers that be in the UNSC
continued to disagree with him, he observed that the determination of
the meaning of the term “persons who bear the greatest responsibility in
any given case falls initially to the Prosecutor, and ultimately to the
195
Using this language, the Secretary-General seemed to
SLSC itself.”
adopt a negotiating tactic in an attempt to have his way, although he did
not later clarify whether his position that the “most responsible”
196
language should not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, which
197
was ultimately rejected, was also equally applicable to the “greatest

193. Id. ¶ 31.
194. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 103, para. 2.
195. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated July 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/693 (July 12, 2001)
[hereinafter Letter dated July 12, 2001 from Secretary-General] (indicating acceptance of the
agreement by the parties with no subsequent mention of the “most responsible” and “greatest
responsibility” language).
197. See SCSL Statute, supra note 3, art. 1(1) (containing the language “persons who
bear the greatest responsibly”); U.N.-Sierra Leone Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1(1)
(containing the language “persons who bear the greatest responsibility”).
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responsibility” formulation. In a way, he left some ambiguity in the
hope that it would help bolster his reading, which invoked Sierra
Leone’s concerns as well, to caution the UNSC that it would be up to
the court’s prosecutor and judiciary to settle on the final position as to
what greatest responsibility jurisdiction ultimately entailed. He thus
also sent a message to the prosecutor that he enjoyed a measure of
discretion, despite the prescriptive greatest responsibility language
contained in the agreement and statute. It would seem that great weight
can therefore be attached to the tribunal’s practice in line with that
position as well as the VCLT principles.
The Secretary-General’s letter then stated, with explicit reference to
the second half of Article 1(1):
Among those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes
falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court, particular
mention is made of “those leaders who, in committing such
crimes, have threatened the establishment of and
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.” It is my
understanding that, following from paragraph 2 above, the words
“those leaders who . . . threaten the establishment of and
implementation of the peace process” do not describe an element
of the crime but rather provide guidance to the prosecutor in
determining his or her prosecutorial strategy. Consequently, the
commission of any of the statutory crimes without necessarily
threatening the establishment and implementation of the peace
process would not detract from the international criminal
198
responsibility otherwise entailed for the accused.
The President of the Security Council’s response to the SecretaryGeneral, appeared to endorse the Secretary-General’s two preferred
ways of interpreting Article 1(1) in the following terms:
The members of the Council share your analysis of the
importance and role of the phrase “persons who bear the greatest
responsibility[.”] The members of the Council, moreover, share
your view that the words beginning with “those leaders
who . . . .” are intended as guidance to the Prosecutor in
199
determining his or her prosecutorial strategy.

198. Letter dated Jan. 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 103, para. 3
(emphasis added).
199. Letter dated Jan. 31, 2001 from Pres. of S.C., supra note 20, para. 1.
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This language was vague in that the reference to the “importance” and
“role” of Article 1(1) provision does not entirely specify whether the
Security Council felt that the personal jurisdiction phrase is (1) limited
to leaders alone, or (2) not necessarily limited to leaders alone because
it will include those whose actions were so grave that they merited
prosecutions (even if they did not functionally hold high-ranking
positions). As to the second sentence of the clause, and arguably by
implication, not the first sentence, it appears evident that the UNSC
Security Council agreed with Annan that it does constitute a guideline
for the prosecutor’s exercise of his discretion without necessarily serving
as a legal ingredient or requirement of the crimes. Thus, consistent with
the finding of this article as shown in Part III, Article 1(1) offered two
separate meanings: the first part of the sentence being a personal
jurisdictional threshold; and the second part, especially when read
together with Article 15(1) outlining the powers of the prosecutor,
establishing a limitation for the prosecutorial application of her
discretion though not necessarily foreclosing the extension of the
jurisdiction to the political leaders and the killer perpetrators.
In his last publicly available letter on the greatest responsibility
issue, dated July 12, 2001, the Secretary-General notified the Council
that the exchange of letters led to modifications of the text in both the
200
draft UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and the Statute annexed to it. As
this back and forth communication had been an internal conversation
between two U.N. organs, he confirmed that “[t]he Government of
Sierra Leone was consulted on these changes and by letter of 9 February
2001 to the Legal Counsel expressed its willingness to accept the
201
This fact, therefore, made the communication a subsequent
texts.”
agreement between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of
the treaty in the Article 31(2) VCLT sense.
In Fofana, Trial Chamber I, after meticulously reviewing the above
drafting history, had also ruled that the “agreed text resulted in the
adoption of the phrase” on personal jurisdiction as articulated in Article
1(1) of the Statute with the specific duties of the prosecutor in that
202
regard prescribed in accordance with Article 15(1). It was on this basis
that the chamber concluded that “the issue of personal jurisdiction is a
200. Letter dated July 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 197.
201. Id.
202. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, Decision on the Preliminary
Defence Motion on the Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Filed on Behalf of Accused Fofana,
¶ 26 (Mar. 3, 2004).
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jurisdictional requirement, and while it does of course guide the
prosecutorial strategy, it does not exclusively articulate prosecutorial
203
discretion, as the Prosecution has submitted.”
Upon closer examination, it is clear that Trial Chamber I believed,
correctly in my view, that personal jurisdiction created a jurisdictional
threshold. However, the nuance in the language is that this group of
judges did not say that “greatest responsibility” was a jurisdictional
requirement in the entirety of the provision. Rather, they felt that the
“issue of personal jurisdiction” also contained language purporting to
guide the prosecutor on how she should use her power. It follows that it
is correct that Article 1(1) was neither exclusively jurisdictional nor
exclusively directed at demarcating the contours of prosecutorial
discretion. In contrast, Trial Chamber II, for its part, was critical of the
judicial colleagues in the other chamber and explicitly determined that
the “greatest responsibility” did not create a jurisdictional requirement
because it only limited to a small category the number of persons that
204
were to be prosecuted. Significantly, the above reading that the two
ideas were encompassed in the same phrase as well as in that
enumerating the prosecutors duties appears to be confirmed by the
contents of the July 12, 2001, letter to the Council, in which the
Secretary-General explained as follows:
Members of the Council reiterated their understanding that,
without prejudice to the independence of the prosecutor, the
personal jurisdiction of the Special Court remains limited to the
few who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes
205
committed.
V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FROM THE SCSL
In taking up previously uncharted terrain, outside the confines of the
debates in the trials in Sierra Leone, this Article has shown that it is
imperative for the creators of international criminal tribunals to
properly delineate their personal jurisdiction.
The greatest
responsibility formula used at the SCSL was politically convenient for
the Council, which was keen to establish a cheap and time limited ad
hoc court that would prosecute only a small group of people in Sierra
203. Id. ¶ 27.
204. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (June 20, 2007).
205. Letter dated July 12, 2001 from Secretary-General, supra note 197 (emphasis
added).
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Leone. But, as I have shown through this original contribution to the
literature, without further specificity, such general statements of
personal jurisdiction in practice raise serious issues of interpretation and
application in concrete cases due to vagueness.
In the Cambodia Tribunal, which has the closest personal
jurisdiction wording to that of the Sierra Leone court, an identical
concern arose as to the meaning of Article 1(1) of the ECCC Law,
which provided for the trial of “senior leaders of Democratic
206
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes.”
This phrase is in one way an improvement on what was used in Sierra
Leone in the sense that the first part of the phrase specifically identifies
senior leaders while the second part mentions those most responsible.
In that way, the ECCC approach apparently adequately addresses the
policy concerns of Secretary-General Annan in the Sierra Leone
situation: that the leaders, architects, or planners of the mass crimes as
well as their followers responsible for grave crimes should all as a prima
207
The legal framework must be
facie matter be deemed prosecutable.
clear and accommodating, but the prosecutor should ultimately make
the final choice. The Cambodia formulation also reflects the general
purpose behind internationally supported criminal prosecutions which,
as we saw in our historical review starting with the Nuremberg Tribunal,
had always aimed to ensure the prosecution of leaders for their crimes.
The only difficulty is that even the ECCC phrase is still somewhat
ambiguous. The second part of the sentence, speaking to those most
responsible, suggests a focus on the persons to be tried for the depravity
or severity of their acts. Unsurprisingly, taking a cue from the
developments respecting their brethren at the SCSL, the defense
counsel litigated that issue arguing, at the close of the first trial, that the
208
Cambodia Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the first defendant Duch.
The chamber, drawing on the logic of the Sierra Leone Court,
determined that the accused, as a senior leader, fell within its personal
209
That conclusion was
jurisdiction as one of those most responsible.
210
unsuccessfully challenged on appeal.
206. U.N.-Cambodian Agreement, supra note 35; see also G.A. Res. 57/228, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/57/228 B (May 13, 2003) (approving draft of ECCC Agreement).
207. Secretary-General, Report on SCSL, supra note 4, ¶¶ 29–30.
208. Prosecutor v. Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment, ¶ 14 (July 26,
2010).
209. Id. ¶ 24–25.
210. Duch, Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 79 (Feb. 3, 2012).
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In terms of lessons learned from Sierra Leone, it seems too early to
draw final conclusions as to whether the SCSL jurisprudence will be
found well reasoned enough to be followed by other courts. That said,
the following tentative observations may be offered with respect to the
case law it has bequeathed us on this particular issue. First, this type of
clause, spelling out personal jurisdiction, should be avoided. Failing
that, if the “greatest responsibility” language needs to be used, it is
important to at least attempt to define what the phrase means to say
that a court shall prosecute those bearing greatest responsibility.
Fortunately, this is in fact what the draft statute of the Special Tribunal
for Kenya attempted to do. Again, in that instance, the same logic of
focusing on leaders in positions of authority and influence as well as
those most vicious in committing the crimes was already evident in the
211
The drafters of
relatively more precise definition that was offered.
that clause clearly knew of the SCSL experience, since they attempted
to resolve some of the thorny issues that led to much ink being spilled by
counsel and judges during the court’s decade-long life. Regrettably,
because the Kenya hybrid tribunal never saw the light of day, as the bill
failed to obtain sufficient support for passage into law in the Kenyan
212
Parliament, there was a missed opportunity to see whether that clearer
phrase would have fared better during the concrete trials of the suspects
responsible for the post-election violence, which rocked that country in
December 2007.
Second, future ad hoc tribunal statutes should explicitly state
whether such a phrase is or is not a jurisdictional requirement that must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the crime. It
seems obvious that it should not be treated as such, because it would
211. Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, supra note 21, pt. I § 2.
following definition:

The Bill offers the

“[P]ersons bearing the greatest responsibility” means a person or persons who were
knowingly responsible for any or all of the following acts: planning, instigating,
inciting, funding, ordering or providing other logistics which directly or indirectly
facilitated the commission of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; in
determining whether a person or persons falls within this category, the Tribunal shall
have regard to factors including the leadership role or level of authority or decision
making power or influence of the person concerned and the gravity, severity,
seriousness or scale of the crime committed.
Id. (emphasis added).
212. Kenya: Quorum Stops the Bill on the Establishment of the Special Tribunal to Try
Violence, AFRICAN PRESS INT’L (Fed. 6, 2009), http://africanpress.me/2009/02/06/kenyaquorum-stops-the-bill-on-the-establishment-of-the-special-tribunal-to-try-violence/.
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otherwise make prosecutions of concrete cases rather difficult and
procedurally cumbersome. This is the lesson of the Sierra Leone Court,
which struggled throughout its trials to repeatedly make the simple
point to defendants and their counsel that the focus of prosecution of
persons in leadership positions did not mean that those of lower rank, in
effective control, could not also simultaneously or alternatively be
pursued by an international court with “greatest responsibility
language” as the anchor of its personal jurisdiction. Instead, as we have
seen, attempts to judicially settle the issue led to more challenges, in
different cases, at different stages of the trial process (pre-trial, trial, and
appeal).
Third, and closely related to the second point, if greatest
responsibility is to be used to delineate the boundaries of the power that
the tribunal prosecutors enjoy, that purpose should be stated explicitly.
Although it seems highly unlikely, if there is another separate purpose
for employing such language beyond limiting prosecutorial wiggle room,
that too should be stated. Indeed, it may be wise to include a provision
discussing the relationship between the personal jurisdiction article and
the limitations to the prosecutorial mandate. This would help to avoid
unnecessary procedural hurdles during trials of the suspects and
arguments that the prosecution lacks the power to make choices as to
whom to prosecute from among a wide range of potential perpetrators.
The obviousness of that position did not make the task of the
prosecutor’s in the SCSL any less challenging.
Fourth, though not discussed in this Article per se, to put the matter
beyond any doubt, consideration should also be given to clarifying that
213
the judges have ex proprio motu power to review whether the
prosecution has fulfilled the personal jurisdiction and other
requirements when making a prima facie case. It is beyond dispute that
it is the duty of the judges to ensure fair trials that respect the rights of
the accused take place in a given criminal trial. It is therefore not
enough for them to abdicate this function to the prosecution, as one
chamber effectively did at the SCSL, by saying that they as judges were
not empowered to review the prosecutorial organ or to imply that they
were simply there to rubber stamp the prosecutorial allegations in an
indictment that someone is among those bearing greatest responsibility
for the atrocities committed during a particular conflict.
Fifth, the drafters of statutes, especially at the United Nations Office
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of Legal Affairs, should explicitly consider stating the consequences of a
finding that personal jurisdictional requirements had either been
fulfilled or not. What standard should apply to determine that it had
been fulfilled, and at what stages of the trials? If the threshold is not
fulfilled, what should happen? Would the tribunal have to release the
defendant, and if so, should this be with or without prejudice to the
prosecution? These fundamental questions need some important
answers. Given the Sierra Leone experience, it may be helpful to
indicate whether any such determinations require factual assessments of
evidence or are purely legal questions to be considered by the judges
even before the prosecution calls any witnesses. If factual assessments
are required, then the stage of the trial at which the point should be
considered should be delineated keeping in mind the appropriate
standard of proof. If it is a legal assessment, that too should guide how
the claims can be made, using what evidentiary burden, before reaching
the legal conclusion.
Finally, while this Article noted that the ICC Prosecutor has adopted
the “greatest responsibility” standard to guide his prosecutorial policy, it
may be worth noting that the concern about personal jurisdiction does
not arise there in the same way as it did at the SCSL. Although the
structure and content of the Rome Statute makes this rather difficult, it
may be only a matter of time for a creative defendant to argue that he
should not be prosecuted because he is not among those bearing
greatest responsibility for what happened in a given conflict.
Fortunately, the phrase “greatest responsibility,” though widely used in
ICC prosecutorial practice, is not included in the ICC statute in the
same way it was in the founding document of the SCSL. Its use in the
permanent tribunal is therefore purely a function of prosecutorial
policy, which, although logical, could also be changed at any time
without requiring any amendments to the Rome Statute. Consequently,
as a prosecutorial policy, defendants should not be able to rely on the
phrase to mount a jurisdictional challenge, at least one that would cause
the same type of difficulties for the court as occurred in Sierra Leone. If
a defendant did, it would presumably be relatively easy for the pre-trial
or trial chambers to resolve the issue on the ground that the
prosecutorial policy is mere policy, rather than a statutory requirement.

